It’s time to talk about
cyberbiosecurity
Can you give us an
overview of the emerging
field of cyberbiosecurity?
The feld is so new that its
boundaries are very much in fux.
Some people would include standard
cybersecurity or physical security of life
science facilities. Others tend to include
cybersecurity of clinical data or human
genomics database in this area. People
like the sound bite and often associate
it with a number of other existing felds.
Personally, I have a DNA-centric notion
of this feld. I am focused on
understanding how can DNA synthesis,
DNA sequencing, and bioinformatics
create new vulnerabilities and new risk
management strategies.
What are the risks and
opportunities in the
digitisation of DNA?
Keeping the digitisation of
personal genomics data aside, as
this a diferent issue - in biotechnology,
the main risk is that we don’t really
understand the implications of this
trend. As biologists, we still associate
DNA with a natural molecule carrying
the genetic information of living
organisms. Its digital representation is
just a convenience to help work with
the natural organisms. This is not unlike
the early days of software when
computer programs were bundled with
computing hardware. You can think of
digital DNA as software inspired by
natural DNA, like computer programs
are somewhat reminiscent of natural
languages. This analogy with the
evolution of software radically changes
perspective. Digital DNA becomes
man-made. It becomes the expression
of an intent. It becomes more valuable
than the biological samples that
inspired it. That’s the opportunity.
What do you feel are the
key issues that biologists
should be aware of?
Biologists need to develop a
culture of security in their labs.
Most of us are incredibly naive when we
walk into our labs. Biological processes
have a mind of their own. They tend to
be more complicated, slower, and less
reproducible than other felds of
engineering. That reality gives
biologists a high tolerance for
anomalies. In this context, we tend to
attribute anomalies to the complexity
of biological processes. Without
becoming paranoid, we need to learn
to consider the possibility that our
processes behave in unexpected
ways for other reasons than
biological complexity. Human
errors, accidents, software
bugs, or people trying to hurt
us can also compromise what
we are trying to do in our labs.
What can be done
to create the best
possible strategy for
the future?
Talking about the issue
like we do in this
conversation is certainly a
step in the right direction.
Denial is not a very strong
security posture. By
discussing these issues, we
create an awareness that
increases our security.
How can
people connect
and contribute to
the existing work in
this area?
They can reach out
to me as we are
putting together a centre
that will be a forum to
exchange on these issues.
Innovators Magazine caught up with Professor
Jean Peccoud, Abell Chair in Synthetic Biology at
Colorado State University, to find out why…